Hobbes argues that people hand nearly all power to an absolute sovereign to escape the terror of a lawless "state of nature," while Locke argues that people lend limited power to a government whose first job is protecting life, liberty, and property. The central difference follows from that: Hobbes's subjects may resist only to save their own lives, while Locke's people may overthrow a government that breaks its trust. Both men built their cases on the same fictional starting point—humans before government—but they drew nearly opposite pictures of what that starting point was like and what it required.

The State of Nature: A War of All Against All vs. A Society Under Natural Law

Hobbes opens Leviathan (1651) with a portrait of pre-government life as a "war of every man against every man," where fear of violent death rules every hour and no industry, farming, or trade can flourish because no one is sure the fruits will be theirs tomorrow. He grounds this in rough equality: since even the weakest can kill the strongest by plotting or allying with others, everyone has equal reason to fear everyone else—a claim often called the "equality of vulnerability." His famous image is that life outside government is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." The state of nature is not a place Hobbes thinks most people have literally lived in; it's a logical condition that shows what happens once trust collapses, which is why he treats civil war as a return to it.

Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1690) describes the same condition very differently: a state of liberty where people are equal and bound by a law of nature that reason reveals—no one may harm another's life, health, liberty, or possessions. That law doesn't police itself, though. Every person holds the "executive power" to punish violations, and because people are partial judges in their own cases, disputes spiral. Locke names three "inconveniences" that push people into civil society: there's no settled, known law, no impartial judge with authority, and no power to enforce a fair ruling. The state of war, in Locke, is not everyday life but the special condition that arises when someone uses force without right—so peace is the default, and government exists to keep it that way.

Two details from each text explain their disagreement. Hobbes lists "a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death" as a basic human drive, which is why he expects peace to require a visible, overwhelming power. Locke assumes people can recognize and largely follow a moral law even without a police force, which is why he thinks government can stay limited. Neither man is describing a proven historical event; both are thought experiments designed to show what government must be for.

A concrete comparison sharpens the contrast. Take two neighbors in a boundary dispute with no courthouse, sheriff, or title registry. In Hobbes's model, each suspects the other will strike first, arms himself, and the suspicion becomes self-fulfilling—that's the trap. In Locke's model, the neighbors already know the boundary rule; what's missing is a neutral party to apply it, and the moment they create one, the dispute stops boiling. Same scenario, opposite diagnosis: Hobbes sees a fear problem that only centralized force can fix, Locke sees an enforcement problem that a limited institution can fix.

Power Handed Over vs. Power Lent: Two Different Contract Structures

Hobbes's contract is a near-total transfer. In Leviathan, the multitude authorizes one sovereign—a single person or an assembly—to act on everyone's behalf, and each person says in effect that he authorizes the sovereign's actions and won't accuse him of wrong. Because the sovereign acts as the people's representative, whatever he does is treated as done by the people themselves. Justice and property exist only after the sovereign creates them; the contract is what brings those categories into being rather than being bound by them.

Locke's contract moves in the other direction. People "lend" authority to a government as a fiduciary trust, and the government holds that authority only for specified ends: preserving life, liberty, and estate. Take away the trust and the power goes back to the people who lent it. In Second Treatise, government "dissolves" when the legislature is altered or when ruler and people enter a state of war—language Hobbes would find incoherent, because in his scheme no body sits above the sovereign to annul him.

The two men also disagree about what property is and when it exists. In Hobbes, "mine" and "thine" are meaningless without a sovereign to enforce a rule of distribution; there is "no propriety, no dominion" in the state of nature. In Locke, property arises before government: a person who mixes labor with unowned land or goods converts them into his own by natural right, and government's job is to protect, not create, that title—his explicit contrast with "absolute monarchies" that own their subjects' goods. That single divergence generates most of the practical difference: if property is pre-political, its protection is a condition on government; if it's political, it's a gift from the sovereign.

The "who holds the final say" question resolves here. Hobbes needs a mortal god—Leviathan calls the sovereign an "Artificial Man" whose command ends dispute, since without a final decider arguments about rules would never terminate. Locke's last decider is the community itself, which must judge whether its trustees kept the terms. Note the practical costs each structure carries: Hobbes's design eliminates deadlock at the price of making the sovereign's judgment the only recognized judgment, while Locke's design protects against tyranny at the price of leaving final judgment contested.

Why Hobbes Feared the People's Judgment and Locke Trusted It

Hobbes wrote during the English Civil War, and the scars show. He watched claims of conscience and divine right tear a country apart, and he concluded that the worst political outcome isn't tyranny but disagreement about which authority is final. "In Foro Conscientiae" judges each person; Hobbes says each of the 70 or so contested religious communities in his England may prefer its own preaching to the sovereign's command—so private judgment must surrender to public peace. This isn't a minor aside in Leviathan; more than a third of the book concerns religion and sovereign power, precisely because Hobbes saw sectarian politics as the engine of the war.

Locke's fear ran the opposite way. In Second Treatise he describes people "abused by those whom they have entrusted," and his model before his death in 1704 included representative institutions, a legislature above the executive, and a right to appeal to heaven when force is used without right. His own biography tracks the stakes: he fled England for the Netherlands in 1683 amid suspicion of involvement in the Rye House Plot against Charles II and returned only in 1689 with William III—just a year before publishing the Two Treatises. A writer who spent years watching an executive reshape courts and town charters had reason to distrust concentrated power.

One border case shows the split clearly. Hobbes says in Leviathan that a condemned criminal leaving prison to stab at the guards is acting lawfully—not because he has a right of revolt, but because no covenant can bind a person to give up his own life. Self-defense is a survival exit, not a political check. Locke goes further: a servant sentenced by his master "may kill the master" if the master attacks him without right, because the offender has already broken the trust that protected him—a principle that scales from household to citizenry. Hobbes permits body-level self-preservation; Locke permits structural judgment.

Concrete stakes make the contrast visible. Imagine a ruler who razes a standing Parliament or court for personal convenience. In Hobbes's model, whatever the sovereign does becomes the people's own act, and no formal wrong has occurred—resistance is either disloyalty or a survival emergency. In Locke's, altering the legislature without consent dissolves the government, and the people act as the fence built against the rest of creation's nature. Both outcomes follow logically from premises each man already stated, and the premises, not the conclusions, are what differing readers accept or reject.

Freedom Under an Absolute Sovereign vs. Freedom Under Law

Hobbes defines liberty narrowly: the absence of external impediments to motion, and for citizens it means only the "silence of the law"—freedom to print articles, tend a child, or choose a trade in the areas the sovereign hasn't regulated. Speech, religion, and press fall outside that silence. Because the sovereign creates law and property, his subjects retain liberty where he hasn't bound them, not rights against him. Fear does not make the sovereign's commands wrong; the covenant is what makes them law.

Locke defines liberty as exemption from arbitrary power—"a liberty to dispose" of person and possessions under standing laws that apply to rich and poor alike, with no sudden decree overriding a known rule. Under Locke, law and liberty aren't opposites; law exists to enlarge freedom, and freedom is the path protected by fences, in a contrast so memorable it is often quoted out of context. That is why Locke insists on a standing legislature meeting in regular sessions, a rule against transferring legislative power, and settled, published laws—protections that govern the sovereign's own conduct.

The protection quality flips across the two. In Hobbes, the absolute sovereign is supposed to be the guardian of peace, and that concentration of power is the promised protection. In Locke, the protection the state offers is constrained by standing law, and the state's promised protection only counts if a known rule-rhythm runs ahead of each enforcement act; law is his shield. Hobbes also refuses to grant subjects property rights against the state, while Locke makes property security the government guarantee. The difference shows up in ordinary detail: which rights survive the state's commands, and who qualifies as sovereign.

A workable comparison table lines up the central structural differences (definition dates and terminology from the named editions):

Dimension Hobbes — Leviathan (1651) Locke — Second Treatise (1690)
State of nature War of all against all; constant fear Peace under natural law, with disputes
Source of rights Sovereign creates law and property Natural rights precede and bind government
Transfer of power Authorization of sovereign, near-total Fiduciary trust, revocable
Scope of authority Absolute except self-defense Limited to public good
Law and liberty Liberty is the silence of the law Liberty grows through settled law
Right of resistance Only to save one's own life When trust is broken, government dissolves

Read the table as a chain rather than five separate choices: the fear-based state of nature drives the authorization, which limits liberty to legal silence, which blocks resistance except survival, which places final judgment in the sovereign. Locke's peaceable state of nature drives the trust, which makes law protective, which permits dissolution, which places final judgment in the community. Each man is internally consistent; they simply start from different rules of judgment.

Who Decides Right and Wrong: The Sovereign's Command vs. Natural Law

Hobbes takes the legal-positivist side in Leviathan: before sovereignty there is no moral category that binds future law. Good and evil are what the public person allows or forbids, and the sovereign can no more be accused of injustice than the assembly of people who authorized him—"no man can be bound to accuse himself." There is no higher court, because where would its judges sit? Natural law is a set of rational articles of peace, not a set of commands enforceable against the sovereign.

Locke puts natural law above every throne. The legislature's supreme authority is itself bounded by the law of nature and by local standards of justice, and a law that violates justice doesn't stop being law merely because the sovereign wills it. His sharper move is to ask a question Hobbes answers with authority: who shall judge whether the prince violates the trust? Locke says the people, because the violation happens to them and because the contract always runs to them as the intended beneficiaries. In practice this creates judges above the sovereign—reason and the community—even if no court meets to hear the case.

That disagreement explains why neither writer simply "invented modern politics." Hobbes's sovereign could command a subject to give up his own conscience; Locke's government could not even tax without the consent of the governed's representatives. Hobbes supplies the case for authority wherever peace and settled judgment of right and wrong by a public person, recognized in law, has been better recognized—his logic helped early-modern states centralize law and professionalized administration. Locke supplies the case for constitutionalism and judicial independence: no ruler can be prosecutor, judge, and witness as well by saying quiet consent binds at each act.

A concrete legal edge case shows the stakes of who holds final judgment. Suppose the sovereign commands a form of worship a subject believes fatal to salvation. Hobbes's answer is that the subject would refuse if refusal could not be resisted—no power to enforce compulsion, no counsel enough—and he speaks of the resultant death as "the reward that God will be pleased to give" for fidelity. But he preserves only body-level obedience, not a public right. Locke's whole argument from consent has no room for a sovereign who owns worship—protection of undistorted private conscience is part of the trust. The disagreement isn't just about doctrine; it determines whether the law can require a person to do what he believes wrong and whether a court can even hear that complaint.

In practice, judges today differ in how they interpret their own authority. Read Hobbes narrowly, natural-law reasoning can seem useless to legal interpretation; read broadly, it can appear authoritarian. Neither crack-down reading is Hobbes. Both need the interpretive middle.

Revolution as the Last Resort: Hobbes's Narrow Exit, Locke's Broader Right

Hobbes's system permits resistance at exactly one point: the moment the sovereign's command threatens the subject's own life or bodily safety, which no covenant can waive. Leviathan allows a condemned person to fight his way through the guards, and allowing a soldier to refuse a command to kill himself. Themes of prohibited self-accusation and the "right" that cannot be transferred. It reads almost like a right of resistance. It is not: it's an exit made of self-preservation, not a check on government.

Locke's right of revolution is political and collective. When a long series of abuses shows a "design" to reduce the people to slavery, they may appeal to heaven: not merely individuals defending themselves, but the whole community reclaiming the trust it loaned. He says rulers should obey the fundamental law, and the community has a right to act once the trust is broken. The right is conditional and reactive, not a license to topple any government that passes a law someone dislikes.

The practical difference shows up when the government appoints judges to enforce the law—or so its critics charge. In Hobbes's story, the sovereign's men are technically the people's men, so a royal appointee's decision formally carries no defect. In Locke's story, an executive who subordinates one branch to the crown has broken the trust, and the people may act—a position closer to modern claims that executive control of judges undermines an independent judiciary. Neither man could foresee those debates, but their structures settle each on the side it falls.

For a modern bearer of the argument, note what neither view settles: no formula says when repeated abuses become a "long train." That leaves the risk of premature resistance on Locke's side and the risk of endless passivity on Hobbes's. A reader weighing them ends up with a concrete rule of thumb: use Hobbes when you need a final decider to end a standoff, use Locke when you need limits on whoever holds that decider. That tension is why both arguments live on, often in the same constitution.

How the 1690 Solution Rewrote the 1651 Problem

Acts of Parliament through the late 1600s, especially the Bill of Rights of 1689, turned several of Locke's points into constitutional features within months of his Second Treatise appearing in 1690: parliaments meeting freely, no taxation without consent, no prerogative over standing law. Whether or not it was written as a brief on 1688, the text reads as a constitutional blueprint—and the proximity of publication to settlement matters. Hobbes's Leviathan, by contrast, was printed in 1651 in the middle of a civil war whose outcome wasn't determined yet; it reads as an attempt to prevent a recurrence, not to provide a program.

Deploy each view by matching it to the risk you face. Where the danger is deadlock—factions, paramilitaries, rival claims of authority—Hobbes's case for a single final judgment carries weight, and his caveat that the sovereign must protect peace by the law matters more than critics admit; the sovereign's commands face only the survival exit. In—choose the better spur.

Two failures mark the edges of the debate. A Hobbesian sovereign who is genuinely omnicompetent could still spiral into predation, because the text gives subjects only a right to preserve themselves, leaving a large gap between passive suffering and organized refusal. A Lockean community with no settled institution may rush to dissolution, because "long train of abuses" is a threshold no court can measure reliably. Both failure modes point at the same lesson: institutions, careful rules, and an accepted method work better than either maxim taken alone.

FAQ

Did Hobbes or Locke actually use the phrase "social contract"?

Hobbes used the Latinized "covenant" and "pact" in Leviathan; "social contract" is a later label, popularized by Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Du contrat social in 1762. The standard academic edition of Leviathan edited by Richard Tuck (Cambridge, 1991) still cites covenant language, not the modern phrase. Attributing the phrase directly to either man is an artifact of textbook summaries.

What did Hobbes think of the separation of powers?

He rejected it outright: dividing sovereignty among branches creates the very deadlock in one sovereign he built Leviathan to solve. If the branches of government disagree, an office must be created to resolve the dispute, and then that office is sovereign. So separation is either dangerous in his view, or a way of concealing a single real sovereign behind institutions.

Did Locke approve of absolute monarchy?

No. He explicitly attacked absolute monarchy as no form of civil government at all, because the monarch would be both judge and party in disputes affecting both him and his subjects. Civil government requires a recognized judge capable of deciding rights. An absolute king in Locke's framework is a man in the state of nature with enough power to enforce his partiality.

Who really has final authority for Locke, the people or the law?

Both, in specified order: the law stands when it is made and applied as written; when the legislature or executive rewrites the rules without cleanup, authority reverts to the community that created it. The community doesn't decide every case; it decides only whether the trust has been broken. That limited role is why his "appeal to heaven" is closer to today's constitutional review than to everyday majority rule.

Were other contract thinkers with different views?

Yes—Rousseau argued people can alienate their freedoms to a general will rather than to a named sovereign, and Thomas Paine later argued each generation creates its own government. Compare them to Hobbes and Locke on the same question—who holds final judgment—and the differences will be stark: Hobbes holds the sovereign's command as law's root; Locke keeps a check above it; Rousseau trusts the community's general will as interpreter.

Can a Hobbesian sovereign ever be a tyrant by definition?

By Hobbes's own categories, no—because wrong and injustice only begin once a sovereign has set the rules, so an act made legal by his own making can't be "tyranny" in the same sense. What can still happen is a sovereign who terrorizes or fails to protect, which is bad but is not, in the Leviathan frame, a breach of contractual obligation. That makes the failure case a waste of the sovereign's own task—protection of peace—rather than a legal violation.

Do these views matter for modern constitutions?

Yes—Most modern constitutional orders borrow from both: they create a single executive and final legal authority (Hobbes's side) while surrounding that authority with rights, courts, and election limits (Locke's side). The mixture is a compromise; neither man's system got adopted whole. When you see executive control over courts criticized, or a ruler defended on the ground that he protects order, you're watching the two arguments do work in current politics.

This article is general educational information about the history of political philosophy, not legal or political advice, and it makes no predictions about outcomes of any real dispute. Check current constitutional provisions and law with a qualified local professional before relying on any of this analysis.