The division belonged to Major General John Bell Hood, who commanded a division in Lieutenant General James Longstreet's First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. On the afternoon of July 2, 1863, Hood's Texans and Alabamians attacked the Union left flank at Gettysburg, and two of his brigades — Brigadier General Jerome Robertson's and Brigadier General Evander Law's — drove toward Little Round Top. Hood himself was wounded early in the fight, and the assault on the hill's rocky western slope fell to Colonel William C. Oates's 15th Alabama and the 47th Alabama of Law's brigade.

Why Hood's Division Owned the Confederate Attack Column That Afternoon

Longstreet's First Corps arrived at Gettysburg on July 2 after a night march from Chambersburg, and Lee ordered an attack up the Emmitsburg Road against the Union left. Hood's division formed the right flank of that assault, with Lafayette McLaws's division to its left. Hood had roughly 7,000 to 8,000 men in four brigades: Robertson's Texas Brigade (1st, 4th, and 5th Texas plus the 3rd Arkansas), Law's Alabama Brigade (4th, 15th, 44th, 47th, and 48th Alabama), Brigadier General George T. Anderson's Georgia Brigade, and Brigadier General Henry L. Benning's Georgia Brigade.

The ground in front of Hood was not the open farm fields he expected. The area around the Slyder farm and the base of the Round Tops was broken by stone walls, boulders, and dense woods, which meant his brigades would attack in fragments rather than a single mass. Hood sent word to Longstreet that the terrain made a direct advance inadvisable and that his men should instead swing around the Union left. Longstreet, under orders from Lee to attack, refused and told Hood to go forward as ordered. That exchange is documented in Longstreet's own memoir, "From Manassas to Appomattox," and in Hood's postwar writings.

Hood did not have the option of waiting. Lee's plan for July 2 depended on coordinated pressure along the Union line, and Longstreet's corps was the instrument for the main effort against the left. Hood's division was the rightmost unit in that effort, so its path ran straight into the Devil's Den, Houck's Ridge, and the wooded western slope of Little Round Top.

The Assault on Little Round Top Itself: Law's Alabamians and the 15th Alabama

The brigade that physically climbed Little Round Top's western face was Law's Alabama Brigade, which formed the right of Hood's line. Law's men advanced south of the Devil's Den, crossed Plum Run, and pushed up the slope against the Union III Corps troops and then against Colonel Strong Vincent's brigade of the V Corps. Vincent had been sent to the hill on his own initiative and arrived just ahead of the Confederates.

The most famous single unit in the assault was the 15th Alabama Infantry, commanded by Colonel William C. Oates. Oates's regiment, with the 47th Alabama alongside, attacked up the wooded western slope and struck the 20th Maine under Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain at the extreme left of the Union line. The fight on that slope lasted roughly an hour and a half, with repeated Confederate charges and a final Union bayonet countercharge down the hill. The 20th Maine's stand became one of the most celebrated small-unit actions in American military history, and it is the reason Little Round Top is remembered at all.

Oates later wrote that his men had marched roughly 25 miles that day before the attack and were exhausted and out of water. His account, published in the "Montgomery Advertiser" in 1905 and reprinted in "The War Between the Union and the Confederacy," is one of the few detailed Confederate descriptions of the slope fight. Casualties in the 15th Alabama were severe: Oates reported 82 killed and wounded and 44 missing out of roughly 400 engaged, and the regiment lost most of its field officers.

Where Was John Bell Hood During the Fight?

Hood was wounded by an artillery shell burst above his left arm near the start of the attack, around 4:30 p.m., while directing his brigades forward near the Slyder farm. The wound cost him the use of his arm for the rest of his life. He was carried from the field and command of the division passed to Brigadier General Evander Law, the senior brigade commander present.

That handoff matters because it changed how the attack was managed. Law was already committed to leading his own Alabama brigade, and he now had to coordinate four brigades across broken ground while under fire. Historians have argued for decades about whether Law or Hood bore more responsibility for the piecemeal nature of the assault, and the dispute is well covered in Harry Pfanz's "Gettysburg: The Second Day," which remains the standard operational account.

Hood's absence also explains why the attack never developed a coordinated second push against Little Round Top's summit. The Confederates got close — Oates's men reached the crest area near the 20th Maine's left and were only stopped by the countercharge — but no fresh brigade was fed into the fight at the decisive moment.

Devil's Den, Houck's Ridge, and the Rest of Hood's Attack

While Law's Alabamians climbed Little Round Top, Robertson's Texas Brigade attacked Devil's Den and Houck's Ridge to the north, supported by Benning's Georgians. The 1st Texas, 4th Texas, 5th Texas, and 3rd Arkansas took Devil's Den and the ridge in brutal close-quarters fighting against Brigadier General J. H. Hobart Ward's brigade of the III Corps. The fighting around the Slaughter Pen and Plum Run became some of the most confused and costly of the entire battle.

Anderson's Georgia Brigade pushed up the Emmitsburg Road farther north, where it hit the Union III Corps line near the Rose farm and the Wheatfield. By early evening, Hood's division had driven the Union left back roughly a mile in places, but the attack spent itself against reinforcements from the V Corps and II Corps.

The cost was heavy on both sides. Hood's division suffered several thousand casualties on July 2, with the Texas Brigade alone losing heavily in the Devil's Den fighting. Union losses in the III Corps and V Corps sectors were comparable. The afternoon's fighting produced no breakthrough, but it came closer to unhinging the Union left than any other Confederate effort at Gettysburg.

Confederate unit Commander Objective Outcome
Law's Alabama Brigade Brig. Gen. Evander Law Little Round Top western slope Reached the slope and crest area; repulsed by Vincent's brigade and the 20th Maine countercharge
Robertson's Texas Brigade Brig. Gen. Jerome Robertson Devil's Den and Houck's Ridge Took Devil's Den; held the ridge under heavy fire
Benning's Georgia Brigade Brig. Gen. Henry L. Benning Devil's Den support and Plum Run Supported the Texas Brigade; heavy losses in the Slaughter Pen
Anderson's Georgia Brigade Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson Emmitsburg Road / Wheatfield sector Drove back III Corps units; eventually stalled by V Corps and II Corps reinforcements

The Terrain Problem Hood Spotted Before the Attack

Hood's warning to Longstreet was not hindsight. From his position near the Slyder farm, he could see that his brigades would have to cross broken ground and climb hills rather than sweep up the road. The Round Tops sat behind and above his right flank, and a direct advance would expose his men to fire from the heights. Hood wanted to swing wide to the south and hit the Union left from behind, which would have threatened the army's supply line on the Baltimore Pike.

Lee's orders did not allow that movement. The plan called for a coordinated attack with McLaws's division on the left and Hood on the right, tied to the Emmitsburg Road axis. Swinging wide would have separated Hood from McLaws and risked defeat in detail. Longstreet's refusal was militarily defensible, but the result was that Hood's men attacked into exactly the ground Hood had warned about.

The assault's failure to take Little Round Top came down to timing and numbers more than terrain alone. Vincent's brigade arrived on the hill shortly before the Confederates, and the 20th Maine's countercharge hit Oates's regiment when it was spent. A fresh Confederate brigade at that moment might have changed the outcome. That is the edge scenario historians keep returning to.

Union Defenders Who Stopped the Attack

The men who stopped Hood's brigades are as much a part of the answer as the attackers. Colonel Strong Vincent's V Corps brigade — the 20th Maine, 16th Michigan, 44th New York, and 83rd Pennsylvania — reached Little Round Top's summit just before the Confederates. Vincent was mortally wounded on the slope and died on July 7.

Brigadier General Stephen Weed's brigade, with the 140th New York under Colonel Patrick O'Rorke, arrived on the summit during the fight; O'Rorke was killed leading his regiment into the line. Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett's Battery D, 5th U.S. Artillery, hauled guns up the hill by hand and fired over the heads of the infantry below. Colonel Joshua Chamberlain's 20th Maine held the extreme left.

These arrivals were not coordinated by a higher headquarters. Vincent acted on his own judgment, and Weed's and O'Rorke's movements were similarly improvised. The Union left held at Little Round Top because junior officers made fast decisions, not because Meade's headquarters directed a defense in real time.

Common Mix-Ups: Pickett, Longstreet, and the Wrong Hill

Several confusions surround this question. The most common is attributing the July 2 assault to Pickett's division, which did not arrive at Gettysburg until late on July 2 and fought on July 3 in the attack known as Pickett's Charge. Pickett's men attacked the Union center on Cemetery Ridge, not Little Round Top.

Another confusion is naming Longstreet as the division commander. Longstreet commanded the First Corps and directed the attack, but the division that made it was Hood's. A third mix-up involves the two Round Tops: Little Round Top was the rocky hill with the signal station, and Big Round Top to its south was higher but wooded and unoccupied by Union troops on July 2.

The 20th Maine's bayonet charge is sometimes described as a downhill sweep that swept the entire Confederate force off the hill. In fact, the charge struck the 15th Alabama's flank and drove back the troops immediately in front of the 20th Maine, while other Confederate units on the slope withdrew under pressure from adjacent Union regiments. The broader Union line held, but the fight was confused and close.

How Historians Have Debated the Attack's Significance

Little Round Top's importance has been argued over since the 1880s. The hill commanded the Union army's left flank and the ground behind it, and Confederate artillery on its summit could have swept Cemetery Ridge. That is the standard explanation for why the fight mattered, and it appears in Pfanz's "Gettysburg: The Second Day" and in Edwin Coddington's "The Gettysburg Campaign."

Some historians have pushed back, noting that the hill's summit was too small for significant artillery and that Confederate guns would have been exposed to Union counterbattery fire from Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge. The debate is real but does not change the answer to the question: Hood's division made the attack, and Law's Alabamians made the climb.

Chamberlain's postwar fame, built partly on his own accounts and his later career as governor of Maine, inflated the 20th Maine's role in popular memory. The regiment's stand was genuinely important, but so were Vincent's judgment, O'Rorke's charge, and Hazlett's guns. The most accurate version gives all of them credit and keeps Hood's division at the center of the Confederate story.

FAQ

Was it Hood's division or Law's brigade that attacked Little Round Top?

Both descriptions are correct at different levels. Hood commanded the division, and Law commanded the brigade that made the climb. Hood was wounded before the attack developed, so Law exercised practical command of the brigades on the Confederate right. When you read that "Hood's division attacked Little Round Top," the unit that physically fought on the slope was Law's Alabama Brigade.

Did Pickett's division fight at Little Round Top?

No. Pickett's division was not engaged on July 2 at Little Round Top and did not arrive in time to join the afternoon attack. It fought on July 3 as part of the assault on the Union center remembered as Pickett's Charge. The July 2 attack on the Union left belonged to Longstreet's First Corps, with Hood's and McLaws's divisions doing the fighting.

How many Confederate soldiers attacked Little Round Top?

Law's brigade numbered roughly 2,000 men on July 2, and the two regiments most engaged on the western slope — the 15th and 47th Alabama — totaled around 800. Hood's full division of four brigades numbered somewhere between 7,000 and 8,000. The 15th Alabama alone reported 82 killed and wounded and 44 missing after the fight.

Could the Confederates have taken Little Round Top if Hood had not been wounded?

Possibly, but the outcome depended more on timing than on Hood's presence. Vincent's brigade arrived just ahead of the Confederates, and O'Rorke's 140th New York plugged the summit at the critical moment. A fresh Confederate brigade committed at the right time might have changed the result; Hood's wound made that coordination harder but did not by itself decide the fight.

What happened to the 15th Alabama after the attack?

The 15th Alabama withdrew from the slope with heavy losses and was not engaged again at Gettysburg in a major attack. Colonel Oates survived the war, became a lawyer and politician in Alabama, and wrote a detailed account of the fight published in 1905. His memoir remains one of the best Confederate sources on the Little Round Top assault.

Why is Little Round Top considered so important if the Confederates never took it?

The hill anchored the Union left and offered observation over much of the battlefield. Had it fallen, Confederate artillery and infantry could have threatened the Union rear along Cemetery Ridge and the Baltimore Pike. Whether the Confederates could have exploited a capture is debated, but the position's value to the Union defense on July 2 and 3 is not.

What is the difference between Little Round Top and Big Round Top?

Big Round Top is the higher hill to the south, wooded and unoccupied by Union troops on July 2. Little Round Top is the lower, rockier hill just north of it, and it was the objective of Law's Alabama Brigade. The names are often swapped in casual retellings, which is one reason the assault's geography gets muddled.

How long did the fight on Little Round Top last?

The fighting on the western slope lasted roughly 90 minutes, from about 4:30 p.m. to around 6:00 p.m. The 20th Maine's countercharge came near the end of that window. The broader Confederate attack on the Union left, including Devil's Den and the Wheatfield, continued into the evening and involved far more troops than the hill fight alone.